



St George Campus  
Fall Semester

POL 459H1F/2216H: The Military Instrument of Foreign Policy

Mondays 11:00-13:00

Professor A. Braun

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Office Hours: In person Mondays 13:00-14:00 or online  
(or other times by arrangement) TrinityCollege, 309N  
UTSG or online

**Prerequisite:** POL 114 or POL 209, or POL210, or permission of instructor.

**Exclusion:** POL405/2217

**Synopsis:**

**Course Description and Objectives:**

This undergraduate course analyzes the relationship of military force to politics. Nuclear war and deterrence, conventional war, revolutionary war, terrorism, counter-insurgency, cyberwar, and drone warfare are examined from the perspectives of the U.S., Russia, China, and other contemporary military powers.

Foreign policy provides the context within which one should examine the existence of and the utility of the military instrument of foreign policy. And, as Henry Brandon has written, foreign policy begins at home. Therefore, the introductory part of the course starts with the theory and politics of civil-military relations. Then, in light of endemic international threats and conflicts, the seminar analyses the use of the military instrument of foreign policy. We meld theoretical and pragmatic approaches. Among the subjects covered are the causes of conflict, the development of nuclear weapons, deterrence and nuclear deterrence, arms control and war, and the problems of measuring equivalence and assessing the military establishments and strategies of the major powers, with special emphasis on the defense forces of the USA, Russia/CIS, and China.

**Desired Outcomes:**

The aim of this course is to help acquaint students of international relations with the vital importance of the military instrument in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy and in the functioning of the international system. It is also hoped that thus they will be able to employ additional tools of analysis in the study of international relations.

**Course Requirements:**

1. One essay: 10-15 double-spaced pages, including endnotes. The essay is due **November 17, 2025**. It is worth 40% of the final grade. **Please use University of Chicago style endnotes.** Graduate Students will present one research paper, 15-25 double-spaced pages, due November 24, 2025.
2. Two "reaction papers" to any of the readings: 2 pages double-spaced (each – no citations; reaction papers are critiques of any single required or suggested reading). First reaction paper due **September 29, 2025**. Second reaction paper due **October 20, 2025**. Each reaction paper is worth 10%.
3. Seminar presentation (one) and class discussions participation (40%). Seminar presentations are up to 15 minutes

each.

### Late assignments

Late assignments will be subject to a late penalty of **5%** per day (including weekends) of the total marks for the assignment. Assignments submitted five calendar days beyond the due date will be assigned a grade of zero. Assignments handed in AFTER the work has been returned to the class cannot be marked for credit. Accommodations due to late registration into the course will NOT be approved.

If you are unable to meet the deadline of your assignment/paper due to unforeseen circumstances, you may apply for an extension of time using *an Absence Declaration (via ACORN) or the University's Verification of Student Illness or Injury (VOI) form*. The request must explain the reason for missing the deadline and include appropriate documentation, e.g. [Verification of Student Illness or Injury form](#).

Each request for special consideration is carefully reviewed by the department/course instructor based on the information provided and approval is not guaranteed.

*If you become ill and it affects your ability to do your academic work, consult me right away. Normally, I will ask you for documentation in support of your specific medical circumstances. This documentation can be an Absence Declaration (via ACORN) or the University's Verification of Student Illness or Injury (VOI) form. The VOI indicates the impact and severity of the illness, while protecting your privacy about the details of the nature of the illness. If you cannot submit a VOI due to limits on terms of use, you can submit a different form (like a letter from a doctor), as long as it is an original document, and it contains the same information as the VOI (including dates, academic impact, practitioner's signature, phone and registration number). For more information on the VOI, please see <https://www.registrar.utoronto.ca/policies-and-guidelines/verification-of-illness-or-injury/>. For information on Absence Declaration Tool for A&S students, please see <https://www.artsci.utoronto.ca/absence>. If you get a concussion, break your hand, or suffer some other acute injury, you should register with Accessibility Services as soon as possible.*

### ACORN Absence Declaration

#### ACORN Absence Declaration Tool Syllabus Statement:

Students who miss an academic obligation during the term (i.e., in-class assessment, quiz, paper or lab report) may use the [ACORN Absence Declaration Tool \(AD\)](#) to record an absence in one or more courses. Students may utilize this option once per term for a single absence period of up to seven consecutive days. The declaration period must include the day of declaration and may include past and/or future dates, for a total of up to 7 calendar days.

The ACORN Absence Declaration Tool is intended to be used in the following circumstances:

- A health condition or injury (e.g., illness, serious physical harm, mental health issue, scheduled surgery)
- A personal or family emergency (e.g., unanticipated and unavoidable familial incident beyond the student's control)
- Bereavement (e.g., the death of a student's immediate family member or close friend)

The ACORN Absence Declaration Tool is not intended to be used in the following circumstances:

- Personal social obligations
- Travel not related to your academic program
- Technological issues
- The avoidance of deadlines or tests

Visit the [ACORN how-to page](#) for a step-by-step guide on how to submit an absence declaration. If for any reason you are unable to submit your declaration, contact your College Registrar's Office.

Follow the links below to learn about your options for absences due to the following circumstances:

Reason for Absence	More Information
Religious observances	<a href="#">Muti-Faith Centre</a>

Athletic obligations	<a href="#"><i>Varsity Blues</i></a>
Chronic and ongoing health conditions	<a href="#"><i>College Registrar's Office</i></a>
Attendance at a University sponsored event (e.g., field trip, awards ceremony)	<a href="#"><i>College Registrar's Office</i></a>
Mandatory legal obligations (e.g., jury duty)	<a href="#"><i>College Registrar's Office</i></a>

### **ON ACADEMIC INTEGRITY**

Academic integrity is essential to the pursuit of learning and scholarship in a university, and to ensuring that a degree from the University of Toronto is a strong signal of each student's individual academic achievement. As a result, U of T treats cases of cheating and plagiarism very seriously.

[The University of Toronto's Code of Behaviour on Academic Matters](#) outlines behaviours that constitute academic dishonesty and the process for addressing academic offences. Potential offences include, but are not limited to:

#### In papers and assignments:

1. Using someone else's ideas or words without appropriate acknowledgement.
2. Submitting your own work in more than one course without the permission of the instructor.
3. Making up sources or facts.
4. Obtaining or providing unauthorized assistance on any assignment.

#### On tests and exams:

1. Using or possessing unauthorized aids.
2. Looking at someone else's answers during an exam or test.
3. Misrepresenting your identity.

#### In academic work:

1. Falsifying institutional documents or grades.
2. Falsifying or altering any documentation required, including (but not limited to) doctor's notes.

**With regard to remote learning and online courses, U of T wishes to remind students that they are expected to adhere to the [Code of Behaviour on Academic Matters](#) regardless of the course delivery method. By offering students the opportunity to learn remotely, UTM expects that students will maintain the same academic honesty and integrity that they would in a classroom setting. Potential academic offences in a digital context include, but are not limited to:**

#### **Remote assessments:**

1. Accessing unauthorized resources (search engines, chat rooms, Reddit, etc.) for assessments.
2. Using technological aids (e.g. software) beyond what is listed as permitted in an assessment.
3. Posting test, essay, or exam questions to message boards or social media.
4. Creating, accessing, and sharing assessment questions and answers in virtual "course groups."
5. Working collaboratively, in-person or online, with others on assessments that are expected to be completed individually.

All suspected cases of academic dishonesty will be investigated following procedures outlined [in the Code of Behaviour on Academic Matters](#). If you have questions or concerns about what constitutes appropriate academic behaviour or appropriate research and citation methods, you are expected to seek out additional information on academic integrity from your instructor or from other [institutional resources](#).

#### **Generative AI**

- [Generative AI](#) (e.g., ChatGPT). Generative AI tools are not permitted aids in the course when writing reaction papers or essays.

### **Accessibility Services Statement**

Students with diverse learning styles and needs are welcome in this course. In particular, if you have a disability/health consideration that may require accommodations, please feel free to approach me and/or Accessibility Services as soon as possible.

Accessibility staff are available by appointment to assess specific needs, provide referrals, and arrange appropriate accommodations. The sooner you let us know your needs the quicker we can assist you in achieving your learning goals in this course.

### **Chronic Health, Disability and Religious Observances**

Students seeking academic consideration due to chronic health matters or a documented disability may use the ACORN Absence Declaration. To ensure that students have access to the accommodations necessary to support their academic success throughout the academic session, students should contact [Accessibility Services](#).

Students seeking consideration for religious observances should be given academic consideration in accordance with the [Policy on Scheduling of Classes and Examinations and Other Accommodations for Religious Observations](#).

### **Requesting Academic Consideration**

When an absence declaration is submitted in ACORN, the Absence Declaration Tool sends a record of the absence through email to the contacts listed by the student. It remains the student's responsibility to initiate the process of academic consideration for missed academic obligations by following the instructions in the course syllabus and notifying their instructor.

### **Absences Outside of the Absence Declaration**

Students not using, or ineligible for, the ACORN absence declaration must continue to follow the missed term work policy outlined in their course syllabi and may be asked to provide supporting documentation (e.g., [Verification of Student Illness or Injury Form-VOI](#)).

Falsification of information through the AD or supporting documentation is considered a violation of the Academic Integrity policy.

### **Supporting Student Success**

The University of Toronto offers a diverse range of support for students that are available year-round to address learning skills, accessibility, health & wellness, academic and financial advising, and more. We continuously aim to [foster student success](#) and [encourage a sense of belonging](#).

Students are expected to take responsibility for their academic obligations in order to meet and exceed their learning potential. As such, they are expected to take ownership of their academic progress. This includes developing help-seeking behaviours that are met with compassion and care in their time of need, and actionable next steps to engage them actively in their progress toward graduation. As members of the University of Toronto community, students assume certain responsibilities and are guaranteed certain rights and freedoms. The University has several policies that are approved by the Governing Council and which apply to all students. University policies can be found at <http://www.governingcouncil.utoronto.ca/policies>.

### **Topics and Readings**

#### **Week 1: September 8, 2025 Civil—Military Relations**

##### ***Required readings:***

- Kevin Krupski, "Who's the Boss? Defining Civil-Military Relations in the Twenty-First-Century" *Military Review*, Jan-Feb 2023, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2023/Krupski/>
- Andrew Payne, "Bargaining with the Military: How Presidents Manage the Political Costs of Civilian Control," *International Security* 48, no. 1 (July 2023): 166-207, doi: [https://doi.org/10.1162/isec\\_a\\_00468](https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00468).
- David M. Lampton, "How China is Ruled: Why it's Getting Harder for Beijing to Govern." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 1 (January 2014): 74-84.
- James Golby and Mara Karlin, "Why 'Best Military Advice' is Bad for the Military—and Worse for Civilians", *Orbis*, Volume 62, Issue 1, 2018, Pages 137-153, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2017.11.010>

- Renanah Miles Joyce, "Soldier's Dilemma: Foreign Military Training and Liberal Norm Conflict", *International Security*, April 2022, <https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/46/4/48/111176/Soldiers-Dilemma-Foreign-Military-Training-and>
- Sumit Ganguly, "A Tale of Two Trajectories: Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan and India", *Journal Of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 39, ISS. 1, 2016  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2015.1051285?journalCode=fjss20>

**Additional (suggested) readings:**

- Aurel Braun, "The Politics of International Relations: Building Bridges and the Quest for Relevance", *Romanian Political Science Review, Studii Politice, Analele Universitatii Bucuresti, Bucharest*, Vol. XV. No. 4, 2015 pp. 557-569. <http://www.studiapolitica.eu/Archive/2015/studia-politica-vol-xv-no-4-2015>
- Dale Herspring, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States and Russia", *Armed Forces & Society* Vol. 35, No. 4, 2009: 667-687.
- Janine Davidson, "The Contemporary Presidency: Civil-Military Friction and Presidential Decision Making: Explaining the Broken Dialogue", *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 43:1 (March 2013): 129-145.
- Suzanne C. Nielsen, "American civil-military relations today: the continuing relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*", *International Affairs*, 88:2 (2012): 369-376
- James Pattison, "The legitimacy of the military, private military and security companies, and just war theory", *European Journal of Political Theory*, 11:2 (2012) 131-154.
- Laura R. Cleary, "Lost in Translation: The Challenge of Exporting Models of Civil-Military Relations", *Prism* Vol. 3, No. 2, 2012: 21-37.
- Michael F. Wuthrich, "Factors influencing military—media relations in Turkey." *The Middle East Journal* 66:2 (2012) 253-272.
- Marybeth P. Ulrich, "The General Stanley McChrystal Affair: A Case Study in Civil Military Relations." *Parameters* 41, no. 1 (2011): 86-100
- Markus, Kienscherf, "A programme of global pacification: US counterinsurgency doctrine and the biopolitics of human (in) security", *Security Dialogue* Vol. 42, No.6, 2011: 517-535.
- Peter D. Feaver, "Right to be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision", *International Security*, Spring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 35: 87-125.
- Jaroslav, Cwiek-Karpowicz, "Who Makes Decisions? Foreign Policy-Shaping Mechanisms in Russia", *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* Vol. 19, No. 3, 2010: 69-90, 1.
- Clay Risen, "Is Less Defense the Best Offense", *The New York Times*, August 5, 2011.
- Michael P. Noonan, "Mind the Gap: Post-Iraq Civil-Military Relations in America", *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, FPRI article: January, 2008.
- Michael Desch, "Civil-Militarism: The Civilian Origin of the New American Militarism", *Orbis*, Vol. 50, No. 3: Summer 2006.
- Robert Hislope, "Crime and Honor in a Weak State: Paramilitary Forces and Violence in Macedonia", *Problems of Post-Communism*, May-June 2004, pp. 18-27.
- Amanda J. Dory, "American Civil Security: The U.S. Public and Homeland Security", *The Washington Quarterly*: Winter, 2004.
- Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984", from *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War*, edited by Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, pp. 20-58.
- Sam C. Sarkesian, "The Price Paid by the Military", *Orbis*, Vol. 45, No. 4, Fall 2001, pp. 557-568.
- Kurt Dassel, "Civilians, Soldiers and Strife: Domestic Sources of International Aggression", *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 Summer 1998 pp. 107-140.
- Joseph J. Collins, and Ole R. Holsti, "Correspondence: Civil-Military Relations: How wide is the Gap?" *International Security*, Fall 1999, pp. 199-207.
- Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel G. Zirker, eds., *Civil Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States*, Westview, 1996.
- Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton Carew eds., *U.S: Civil Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?* Washington CSIS Books 1995.
- Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996, pp. 37-55.
- S. Andreski, *Military Organization and Society*, London, Routledge & Kaegan Paul 1968.
- Myron Rush, "Guns Over Growth in Soviet Policy" *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1982/83) pp. 167- 179.
- Dimitri, K. Simes, "The Military and Militarism in Soviet Society" *International Security*, Vol: 5, No. 3 (Winter 1981/82) pp. 112 - 143.
- Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, New York, Columbia University Press 1959.
- Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, Glencoe, Ill, Free Press 1960.
- "Armed forces and Society: A world perspective", in J. Van Doorn ed., *Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays*, *The Hague*, Mouton, pp. 15 - 38.
- Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977
- Steven D. Westbrook eds., *The Political Education of Soldiers*, Beverly Hills Calif.) Sage Publications, 1983.

- S. P. Huntington, *The Soldier, and the State*, New York, Wiley 1957.
- Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority*, Cambridge, Harvard, U.P. 1979.
- Kenneth E. Boulding, "The University, Society and Arms Control", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. VII, No. 3, 1962, pp. 458-63.
- S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The role of the military in politics*, New York, Praeger 1962.

**Week 2: September 15, 2025 Power Projection - Russia's War against Ukraine: Power Projection and International Law**

**Required readings:**

- Aurel Braun, "European Self-Reliance: Behind the Curve, but Ready To Step Up", *The National Interest*, March 6, 2025, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/politics/european-self-reliance-behind-the-curve-but-ready-to-step-up>
- Aurel Braun, "The Putin Dilemma: Why Peace in Ukraine Requires Russia's Defeat", *The National Interest*, October 31, 2024, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/putin-dilemma-why-peace-ukraine-requires-russias-defeat-213489>
- Aurel Braun, "A stronger Ukraine would be the only acceptable outcome of the Alaska summit", *The Globe and Mail*, August 14, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-stronger-ukraine-only-acceptable-outcome-alaska-summit/>
- Phillips O'Brien, "The War That Defied Expectations: What Ukraine Revealed About Military Power," *Foreign Affairs*, July 27, 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/war-defied-expectations>.
- Ketian Zhang, "Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, And Beijing's Use Of Coercion In The South ChinaSea," *International Security* 44, no. 1 (2019): 117-159, doi:10.1162/isec\_a\_00354, [https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec\\_a\\_00354](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec_a_00354).
- Lawrence, Freedman, "Why War Fails: Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the Limits of Military Power", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-06-14/ukraine-war-russia-why-fails>
- Aurel Braun, "Tougher Sanctions Now: Putin's Delusional Quest for Empire," *World Affairs* (July/August 2014). <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43556200>

**Additional (suggested) readings:**

- Braun A. *How Putin Bested Obama*. Vol 136. Commentary; 2013.
- War Comes to Ukraine: The Consequences of the Crash in Donetsk. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2014-07-17/war-comes-ukraine>
- Ukraine's Do-It-Yourself War. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/11/ukraines-do-it-yourself-war/>
- Ukraine's Crisis of Legitimacy. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2014-03-03/ukraines-crisis-legitimacy>
- The Czar of Brinkmanship. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-05-05/czar-brinkmanship>
- Aurel Braun, "The Putin Dilemma: Why Peace in Ukraine Requires Russia's Defeat", *The National Interest*, October 31, 2024, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/putin-dilemma-why-peace-ukraine-requires-russias-defeat-213489>
- Phillips O'Brien, "The War That Defied Expectations: What Ukraine Revealed About Military Power," *Foreign Affairs*, July 27, 2023, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/war-defied-expectations>.
- Aurel Braun, "Tougher Sanctions Now: Putin's Delusional Quest for Empire," *World Affairs* (July/August 2014).
- Ketian Zhang, "Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, And Beijing's Use Of Coercion In The South ChinaSea," *International Security* 44, no. 1 (2019): 117-159, doi:10.1162/isec\_a\_00354, [https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec\\_a\\_00354](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec_a_00354).
- Lawrence, Freedman, "Why War Fails: Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the Limits of Military Power", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-06-14/ukraine-war-russia-why-fails>

**Additional (suggested) reading**

- Barry R. Posen. "Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 92:1 (January/February 2013).
- Stephen G. Brooks and G. John Ikenberry and William C. Wohlforth. "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment." *International Security* 37:3 (2012): 7-51.
- Alexander L. Vuving, "The Future of China's Rise: How China's Economic Growth Will Shift the Sino U.S. Balance of Power, 2010-2040." *Asian Politics & Policy* 4:3 (2012): 401-423.
- Kenneth B. Moss, "War Powers and the Atlantic Divide", *Orbis* Vol. 56, No. 2, 2012: 289-307.
- John R. Schmidt, "Last Alliance Standing? NATO after 9/11", *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2007.
- Klaus Bechter, "German Forces in International Military Operations", *Orbis*, Summer 2004.
- Robert A. Pape, "The True Worth of Air Power", *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2004.
- Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "A Duty to Prevent", *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2004. Peter Bender, "America: The New Roman Empire?", *Orbis*, Winter 2003, pp. 145-159.
- Andrew L. Stigler, "A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo", *International Security*,

Winter 2002/2003, pp. 124-157.

Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Eagle has Crash Landed", *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2002.

Jon Western, "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention", *International Security*, Spring 2002, pp. 112-142.

Benjamin O. Ford and Christopher C. Sarver, "Militarized Interstate Disputes and United States Uses of Force", *International Studies Quarterly*, September 2001, pp. 455-466.

John Western, "Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S., Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia", *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 4, Spring 2002, pp. 112-142.

Daryl G. Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare", *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Fall 2001, pp. 5-49.

Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., "Blockade & Geopolitics" *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1983, pp. 166 - 185.

Kenneth N. Waltz, "A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force", *International Security*, Vol. 5, No. 4, Spring 1981, pp. 49 - 73.

Albert Wohlstetter, et. al., *Interest and Power in the Persian Gulf*, Los Angeles, Pan Heuristics, 1980.

"Meeting the Threat in the Gulf", *Survey*, Vol. 25, No. 2, Spring 1980, pp. 128 - 88.

### Week 3: September 22, 2025 Measuring Equivalence

#### Required readings:

Zachary Burdette, "The U.S.-China Military Balance in Space," *International Security* 49, no. 4 (Spring 2025):71-118, [https://doi.org/10.1162/isec\\_a\\_00509](https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00509)

Jason Lyall, "How Inequality Hobbles Military Power", *Foreign Affairs*, July 2022, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-inequality-hobbles-military-power>

Caleb Pomeroy, and Michael Beckley, "Correspondence: Measuring Power In International Relations," *International Security* 44, no. 1 (2019): 197-200, doi:10.1162/isec\_c\_00355, [https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec\\_c\\_00355](https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/isec_c_00355).

Richard Connolly and Mathieu Boulegue, "Russia's New State Armament Programme: Implications for the Russian Armed Forces and Military Capabilities to 2027", *International Affairs*, May 2018, <https://reader.chathamhouse.org/russia-s-new-state-armament-programme-implications-russian-armed-forces-and-military#>

Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can we Measure It?" *International Security*, Vol.22, No. 4, Spring 1998 pp. 44-82.

#### Additional (suggested) readings:

Benjamin H. Friedman, and Justin Logan, "Why the U.S. Military Budget is "Foolish and Sustainable", *Orbis* Vol. 56, No.2, 2012) 177-191.

Mohan Malik, "China and India Today", *World Affairs*, July/August 2012, Vol. 175 Issue 2, pp. 74-84.

Phil Haun and Colin Jackson, "Breaker of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myth of Linebacker I and II in the Vietnam War", *International Security*, Winter 2015/16, Vol. 40, No. 3, Pages 139-178, Posted Online February 10, 2016. [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC\\_a\\_00226](http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ISEC_a_00226)

Robert Legvold, "Managing the New Cold War: What Moscow and Washington can learn from the Last One." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 4 (Jul, 2014): 74-84.

Francine R. Frankel, "The Breakout of China-India Strategic Rivalry in Asia and the Indian Ocean", *Journal of International Affairs* Spring/Summer2011, Vol. 64 Issue 2, pp. 1-17.

Thomas Donnelly, "Countering Aggressive Rising Powers: A Clash of Strategic Cultures", *Orbis*, Vol. 50, No. 3: Summer 2006.

Aurel Braun, "Soviet Naval Policy in the Mediterranean", *Orbis*, Vol. 22, No. 1, Spring 1978, pp. 101-135.

Stephanie G. Neuman, "Defense Industries and Global Dependency", *Orbis*, Vol. 50, No. 3, Summer 2006.

John E. Peters, "A Potential Vulnerability of Precision-Strike Warfare", *Orbis*, Summer 2004.

Christopher Layne, "Offshore Balancing Revisited", *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2002.

Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security", *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 71-104.

Robert A. Pape, "The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power", *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, Winter 1997/8, pp. 93-114.

Mark Lanteigne, "Water dragon? China, power shifts and soft balancing in the South Pacific", *Political Science* Vol. 64, No.1, 2012: 21-38.

John A. Warden III, "Success in Modern War: A Response to Robert Pape's Bombing to Win", *Security Studies*, Vol. 7, Winter 1997/8, pp. 172-190.

E. Luttwak, "Perceptions of military force and U.S. defense policy", *Survival*, January/February 1977.

Mohan Malik, "India Balances China", *Asian Politics & Policy* Vol. 4, No. 3, 2012: 345-376.

Steven L. Canby, "Mutual Force Reductions: A Military Perspective", *International Security*, No. 2 Winter 1978, pp. 122-135.

Herbert Goldhammar, "The U.S. - Soviet Strategic Balance as Seen from London and Paris", *Survival*, September/October 1977.

- Stanley Sienkiewicz, "Observations by the Impact of Uncertainty in Strategic Analysis," *World Politics*, 32, Oct. 1979, pp. 98-99.
- J. D. Steinbrunner and Richard Garwin, "Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance between Prudence and Paranoia", *International Security*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Summer 1976, pp. 138-181.
- Thomas G. Mahnken and Barry D. Watts, "What the Gulf War can (and cannot) tell us about the Future of Warfare", *International Security*, Fall 1997, Vol. 22 No. 2 pp. 151-63.

#### Week 4: September 29, 2025 The Military Establishments

##### **Required readings:**

- SIPRI, "SIPRI Yearbook 2024 'Armaments, Disarmament and International Security'" Oxford University Press, 2024
- The Military Balance 125, no.1, 2025, <https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/tmib20/125/1?nav=toCList>
- Ploumis, Michail. 2022. "AI Weapon Systems in Future War Operations; Strategy, Operations and Tactics." *Comparative Strategy* 41 (1): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2021.2017739>  
<https://www.tandfonline-com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495933.2021.2017739?needAccess=true>
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- Aurel Braun, "European Self-Reliance: Behind the Curve, but Ready To Step Up" *The National Interest*, March, 6 2025, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/politics/european-self-reliance-behind-the-curve-but-ready-to-step-up>
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 Raymond Garthoff, *How Russia Makes War*, London, George Allen & Unwin.  
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### Week 5: October 6, 2025 Macrocosmic Theories of Conflict

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 Friedrich Kratochwil, "Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's 'Social Theory of International Politics' and the Constructivist Challenge," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29:1 (2000), pp. 73-101.  
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 Charles S. Gochman, Henry S. Farber and Jeanne Gowa, "Correspondence", "Democracy and Peace", *International Security*, Vol. 21 No. 3, Winter 1996/97 pp. 177-87.

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- Cimbala, Stephen J., and Adam Lowther. 2022. "Hypersonic Weapons and Nuclear Deterrence." *Comparative Strategy* 41 (3): 282–95. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2022.2057736>.  
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### Week 7: November 3, 2025 Deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence

#### Required readings:

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- Stephen Biddle, "Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Anti-access/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia" *International Security*, Summer, 2016, Vol. 41, No. 1, Pages 7-48  
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 Scott D. Sagan, "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks", *International Security*, Spring 2000, pp. 85-115.  
 Robert E. Harkavy, "Triangular or Indirect Deterrence/Compellence: Something New in Deterrence Theory?" *Comparative Strategy*, January-March 1998, pp. 63-81.  
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#### **Week 8: November 10, 2025 Criticism of Deterrence and Certain Problems of Arms Control**

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- Charles A. Duelfer, "Chronic Misperception and International Conflict: The U.S.-Iraq Experience", *International Security*, Summer 2011, Vol. 36, No. 1: 73-100.
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- Zdzislaw Lachowski, "Half-Century of Arms Control: A Tentative Score Sheet", *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* Vol.19, No. 4, 2010: 40-II.
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- Matthew Fuhrmann, and Jeffrey D. Berezikian, "Disaggregating Noncompliance: Abstention versus Predation in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 56, No.3, 2012: 355-381.
- Sachio Nakato, "North Korea's Second Nuclear Test: Neoclassical Realism Perspectives", *Pacific Focus*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2012: 10-35.
- Marvin Schaffer, "Moral nuclear deterrence – the ascendancy of missile defense", *Foresight*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2012): 260-271.
- Aurel Braun, "Confidence Building Measures, Security and Disarmament", in R. Spencer, ed., *Canada and the Conference on Security on Co-operation in Europe*, University of Toronto, 1984, pp. 204-28.
- Stephen Blank, "Resets, Russia and Iranian Proliferation", *Mediterranean Quarterly* Vol. 23, No. 1, 2012: 14-38.
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**Week 9: November 17, 2025. Russian/CIS, Chinese, and American Approaches to Deterrence and Nuclear War—(A) Russia/CIS/China**

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#### Week 10: November 24, 2025 Russia/CIS and American Approaches to Deterrence and Nuclear War— (B)The United States

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- Patrick Porter, "[Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment](#)", *International Security*, 2018 42:04, 9-46, [https://doi.org/10.1162/isec\\_a\\_00311](https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00311)
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- François Heisbourg, "A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine", *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2003.
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**Week 11: December 1, 2025 Conventional War: large-scale inter-state conflict*****Required readings:***

- Carter Malakasian and Zachery Constantino, "Nuclear Powers, Conventional Wars," *Foreign Affairs*, July 17, 2025, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/nuclear-powers-conventional-wars>
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- Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, *Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict*, (United States Institute of Peace, 2001).
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**Week 12: December 2, 2025 Internal War/Counterinsurgency/Counterterrorism**

Make-up class

**Required readings:**

- Emily Myers, "Insurgent Conscriptio for Capacity and Control: State Violence and Coerced Recruitment in Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 69, no. 5 (2025): 925–952, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027241269952>.
- Niklas Karlén and Vladimir Rauta, "Dealers and Brokers in Civil Wars: Why States Delegate Rebel Support to Conduit Countries," *International Security* 47, no. 4 (2023): 107-146, doi: [https://doi.org/10.1162/isec\\_a\\_00461](https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00461).
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Thomas Braun. "Beyond Counterinsurgency: Why the Concept is Failing." *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 11:3 (2012) 77-84.

Harsh V. Pant, "The Pakistan Thorn in China-India-U.S. Relations", *Washington Quarterly* Winter2010/2012, Vol. 35 Issue 1, p83-95.

Lawrence Freedman, "The Counterrevolution in Strategic Affairs", *Daedalus* Vol.140, No.3, 2011: 16-32.

Christopher O. Bowers, "Identifying Emerging Hybrid Adversaries", *Parameters* Vol. 42, No. 1, 2012: 39- 50.

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John Mueller, and Mark G. Stewart, "The Terrorism Delusion: America's Overwrought Response to September 11", *International Security* Vol. 37, No. 1, (2012): 81-110.

Bryan C. Price, "Targeting Top Terrorists: How Leadership Decapitation Contributes to Counterterrorism", *International Security* Vol. 36, No. 4, 2012: 9-46.

Jeffrey Treistman, "Home Away From Home: Dynamics of Counterinsurgency Warfare", *Comparative Strategy* Vol. 31, No. 3, 2012: 235-252.

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Larry Goodson, and Thomas H. Johnson. "Parallels with the Past – How the Soviets Lost in Afghanistan, How the Americans are Losing", *Orbis* Vol. 55, No.4, 2011: 577-599.

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### Plagiarism

The importance of a proper scholarly apparatus (i.e., good footnoting, use of academically respectable sources, being careful not to abuse electronic sources, etc.) in writing assignments: Recently, the UTM Political Science department drafted a document which contains the following helpful statement of principles. This should guide you in your writing assignments in this course.

#### • Why Proper Citations are Necessary

Many students mistakenly believe that the sole purpose of proper citations and referencing is to safeguard against suspicion of academic dishonesty. In actual fact, a reader may wish simply to learn more about the issue in question, and citations make that possible. Instructors should emphasize to students three points:

1. Academic inquiry is an ongoing 'conversation' within a scholarly community. Proper references are the 'record' of that conversation.
2. The advance of knowledge presupposes such a record. Proper references enable scholars to do research that builds upon, complements, or challenges views reached by other members of the community.
3. A reference or a citation is therefore a claim that the author has read the material, understood it, and proposes either to build upon it or to contest its validity. An author who offers a citation is therefore claiming familiarity with the material cited or referenced.

#### • When Citations and References are Required

The idea of a continuous 'conversation' is especially appropriate for political science, which rarely settles on definitive conclusions. For students to participate in the conversation, they must understand that while references always involve judgments, there are commonly accepted reasons to cite source material:

1. To indicate the source of every direct quotation;
2. To indicate the source of material that is being paraphrased or summarized;
3. To acknowledge indebtedness to other authors for opinions, data and ideas that are not generally regarded as common knowledge;
4. To lend authority to a claim that the reader may reasonably be expected to question;
5. To support a statement for which there is either a single authority or about which there are conflicting perspectives;
6. To inform the reader of where to find alternative perspectives, corroborative authorities, or more extensive discussion of the topic.

As regards use of the Internet: While no one would deny that Google & other digital resources can be very helpful in doing academic research, there are also significant potential perils involved in relying too heavily on the Internet (taking shortcuts to minimize actual reading, which leads to intellectual laziness; using sources that are not academically respectable; forgetting what the inside of a library looks like; etc.). Again, I would urge you to exercise maximum caution in your use of the Internet, & consult me if you're unsure whether you're making wise or unwise use of it!

### A WARNING ABOUT PLAGIARISM

Plagiarism is an academic offence with a severe penalty.

It is essential that you understand what plagiarism is and that you do not commit it. In essence, it is the theft of the thoughts or words of others, without giving proper credit. You must put others' words in quotation marks and cite your source(s). You must give citations when using others' ideas, even if those ideas are paraphrased in your own words. Plagiarism is unacceptable in a university. What the university calls "plagiarism", non-university institutions might call "fraud".

The University of Toronto provides a process that faculty members must initiate when they suspect a case of plagiarism. In the Department of Political Science, suspected evidence of plagiarism must be reported to the Chair; in most cases, the Chair passes the case on to the Dean.

A faculty member may not mark an assignment or assess a penalty if he or she finds evidence of plagiarism – the matter must be reported. Penalties are assigned by the Chair, by the Dean or by the University of Toronto Tribunal.

The following are some examples of plagiarism:

1. Submitting as your own an assignment written by someone else.
2. Quoting an author without indicating the source of the words.
3. Using words, sentences, or paragraphs written by someone else and failing to place quotation marks around the material and reference the source and author. Using either quotation marks or reference alone is not sufficient. Both must be used!
4. Adapting an author's ideas or theme and using it as your own without referencing the original source.
5. Seeking assistance from a friend or family member in respect to work you claim as your own.

Ignorance of the rules against plagiarism is not a defense; students are presumed to know what plagiarism is and how to avoid it. Students are especially reminded that material taken from the web must be quoted and cited in the same manner as if it came from a book or printed article. If you are not sure whether you have committed plagiarism, it is better to ask a faculty member or teaching assistant than risk discovery and be forced to accept an academic penalty.

Plagiarism is cheating. It is considered a serious offence against intellectual honesty and intellectual property. Penalties can be severe, ranging from a mark of "0" for the assignment or test in question, up to and including expulsion from the university.

How to Use Sources and Avoid Plagiarism - available at: <http://www.writing.utoronto.ca/advice/using-sources/how-not-to-plagiarize>.

Other Advisory Material available at: <http://www.writing.utoronto.ca/advice/using-sources>