From the Chair

This issue of *Discourse* marks the passing of a dear friend and colleague, **Paul Fox**. Paul was known and loved by many, many people, within the University and without, and all those who knew him will miss his keen intelligence, his unflagging interest in the life and fortunes of his country and its people, and the wicked gleam in his eye. **Peter Russell** has written an appreciation of Paul in these pages, and he catches his life and contribution wonderfully. Peter describes very well the remarkable memorial service at Victoria that Paul had a big hand in organizing before he died. The only thing I would add is that the reception afterward was classic Paul Fox – lots of good food and a full bar - and therefore it did not matter that it was in a Presbyterian college and in the middle of the day.

There have been comings, as well as goings. I am very happy to announce that by the time this issue of *Discourse* appears **Ramin Jahanbegloo** will have joined our Department. A political philosopher, he is returning to the University of Toronto as a professor of Political Science, a Research Fellow in the Centre for Ethics, and a Massey College Scholar-at-Risk. A dual citizen of Canada and Iran, Ramin taught in our Department from 1997-2001. He then returned to Tehran, where he was head of the

Paul Fox circa 1970

Department of Contemporary Studies of the Cultural Research Bureau. In that role, Ramin led a remarkable program of intellectual exchange and intercultural dialogue, bringing a series of leading Indian, European and North American intellectuals to lecture in Iran. These included Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, Fred Dallmayr, Michael Ignatieff, Timothy Garton Ash, Agnes Heller, Paul Ricoeur, and Antonio Negri.

Ramin regularly addresses both scholarly and general public audiences through his lectures and essays on tolerance and difference, democracy and modernity, and the dynamics of Iranian intellectual life. He has published over 20 books in English, French and Persian, including: *The Spirit of India* (2008), *India Revisited: Conversations on Continuity and Change* (2007),

Talking India: Conversations with Ashis Nandy (2006), *Iran: Between Tradition and Modernity* (2004), *Gandhi: Aux Sources de la Nonviolence* (1998), *Penser la Nonviolence* (1999) and *Conversations with Isaiah Berlin* (1992).

On his way to an international conference from Tehran in April 2006, Jahanbegloo was arrested by Iranian authorities and sent to Evin Prison. He was released on August 30, 2006. He rejoins the University of Toronto after spending 2006-07 as Rajni Kothari Professor of Democracy at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in New Delhi, India. To celebrate his return to Canada and to the University of Toronto, Ramin will deliver a homecoming lecture based on his new book, *The Clash of Intolerances* on January 28 at the Isabel Bader Theatre.

In the following pages, you will read not only about Paul Fox, but about a black box in a former Soviet republic (**Deibert**), climate governance (**Hoffmann**), early learning and child care policy (**White and Friendly**), poverty and the politics of credit allocation in rural China (**Ong**), and environmental protection, human rights and sustainable development (**Purdon**). Not only that: if you are attentive, you will discover the link between electoral choice and the Borda method, the eminent French enlightenment philosopher, the Marquis de Condorcet, and baseball (**Levine**)…

Paul Wesley Fox
(1921 – 2007)

Peter H. Russell

In October the Department lost one of its finest – Paul Fox. Paul was a marvelous teacher, a great scholar and a wonderful colleague and friend.

Paul's ties to the University of Toronto go back 67 years to 1940, when he enrolled in the Department of Economics and Political Science's premier honours course. He graduated in 1944 with the Gold Medal and Victoria College's Senior Stick, and immediately went off to military service as a Lieutenant in the Canadian Life Infantry. After the war, as an MA student, he taught in the Department, first as a TA and then as an Instructor, before going to London in 1946 to pursue a doctorate at the LSE. In 1948, he took up his first full time position at Carleton University, where he taught political science until moving to Toronto in 1956 to join the Department of Political Economy. For 33 years Paul Fox anchored our Department's teaching, graduate and undergraduate, in Canadian government and politics. He spent his final ten years at U of T as Principal of Erindale College in Mississauga.

Those are the bare bones of Paul Fox's academic career. But it is the warm and generous personality of the man who lived that career that so many of us will treasure. It was always a pleasure to run into Paul in the Department's corridors. He enjoyed the theatre of politics and loved talking about the never-ending stream of characters that came across the national and international stage. Even in his final days, those of us who visited him found him full of lively interest in all that was going on. His good humour, wit and lively conversation will be sorely missed.

For me, arriving in the Department in 1958, Paul was a model teacher. Of course, he did his writing and scholarship, but for Paul, teaching came first. His courses were carefully laid out, every topic supported by relevant, up-to-date and available readings, many writing assignments, sparkling lectures, a well-instructed core of TAs to conduct the tutorials – and lots of time for students to drop in and talk with him. Those were the days when our feet weren't being held to the fires of tenure and promotion committees!

Paul was a model in another way: he gave generously of his time and talent to his profession, and his country. He served as co-editor of the Canadian Journal of Political Science in the Journal's early years and was the first member of our Department to be elected President of the Canadian Political Science Association. His many editions of *Politics Canada* and his organization of McGraw-Hill Ryerson's series of political science texts provided the indispensable literature for a generation of Canadian political science students and teachers. His fluency in French and deep concern for the survival of our federation both motivated and enabled him to make major contributions to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the Bilingual District Boards and Ontario's Advisory Committee on Confederation. And he did not confine his teaching to the classroom. His lucid explanations of the politics of the day frequently graced the air-waves and his vibrant image of political commentator was often projected on our television screens.

It was Paul's excellence at teaching that was the key to his becoming Principal of Erindale. As the Principal of Innis College, I happened to be a member of the search committee that selected Paul. After considering a number of leading candidates for the position, a student member of the committee spoke up and said that the best professor she had had at the university was Paul Fox. She suggested that we should consider him for the Erindale position. I think Paul, who had never held administrative office at the university, was somewhat surprised when he was approached by the committee chair. But he agreed to meet with the committee, and it didn't take us long to realize that Paul had all the qualities we were looking for in an academic leader. By all accounts Paul did much for Erindale. Among other things he turned out to be a gifted diplomat for the College, cementing its ties to the City of Mississauga and its dynamic mayor.

For those who know Paul as a leading scholar of Canadian politics, it is a surprise to learn that his Ph D thesis at LSE was on the political thought of Louis XIV, the great seventeenth-century French monarch. I have not been able to obtain a copy of the dissertation but the central themes of his analysis are set out in an article he published in the Journal of Economics and Political Science in 1960. There he argues that what distinguished Louis XIV from both his contemporaries and his predecessors was his emphasis on personal rule. Paul says that Louis was an "autocrat" more than an "absolutist", less than a complete despot and not a tyrant: "His overlay of Christian culture…led to self-imposed restraints."

The thesis on Louis XIV led Paul into the general study of political leadership. It was a subject that deeply interested him throughout his life. The study of political leadership was the theme of his 1980 presidential address to the Canadian Political Science Association. In that address Paul drew his colleagues' attention to how little systematic study had been applied to the study of political leadership. He was particularly interested in the two-way relationship between effective leaders and those they lead. Paul coined a new word for the study of the kind of leadership he thought was most needed in our democratic age: hegetology. This word he derived from the Greek word, *hegetes* – a leader who is an instructor, a teacher who shows the

way. Reading that speech today and reflecting on Paul's life and work, one cannot help thinking – despite Paul's modesty – that *hegetes* fits him very well.

Those of us who attended the service of thanksgiving at Victoria College for the life of Paul Fox encountered a part of Paul that, though fundamental to his life, was not something he often spoke about. Because Paul knew months before that his disease could not be arrested, he was able to plan his memorial service. There would be no eulogy. As his dear wife Joan said to me "Paul could be fiercely proud about his modesty." The service was Paul's selection of passages from scripture, prayers and hymns from both Christian and Jewish sources, and reflecting the broad and deep nature of his faith. Through those words we could hear the spiritual side of Paul speak and perhaps no more so than in the verse of Hebrews that asks "What is faith?" and answers "Faith gives substance to our hopes, and makes us certain of realities we do not see."

Peter H. Russell is Professor Emeritus at the Department of Political Science, University of Toronto

The Professor Who Came in From the Code

Ron Deibert

F all 2003. It is 3:30 am and I'm logged on to the Citizen Lab's secure chat. Online is my lead technical researcher, and now PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, Nart Villeneuve and one of our trusted field agents, whom we shall refer to as "Ronin"

Nart and I are in Toronto, but Ronin is several time zones away in a former Soviet republic, and he's in a state of panic.

"Quickly," types Ronin hurriedly, "someone coming!"

Ronin is surreptitiously installing one of our "black box" hard drives onto the network of an internet service provider inside the country, and Nart needs to execute a few short commands to gain secure access from Canada and confirm the box is running before Ronin can pack up and leave.

Several painful seconds go by and nothing from Nart. "HURRY" Ronin screams in all-caps.

"I'm in!" Nart finally types.

Ronin exits the chat in silence. Mission accomplished.

In moments such as these, I often sit back in wonder at how far removed my current professional activities are from those of most academics. I wonder what my col-

Ron Deibert

leagues would think if they only knew about nights like this. I wonder how I can report what amounts to a form of human rights "espionage" in my annual activity report. Above all else, I wonder how I ended up publishing about the epistemology of Harold Innis one day and installing "black boxes" in former Soviet republics the next.

In hindsight, the transition happened rather quickly. About a decade ago, I felt like I had hit a wall professionally. I had published in many social science journals and produced a book that was cited about as much as might be expected. But I felt I had reached the limits of my knowledge. I was trained as a social scientist, but was interested in doing research in an area that required advanced technical skills. Mine were limited.

I also felt that my work was not having much of an impact outside of the limited dent it made in a small circle of international relations theorists. I yearned to get my hands dirty, to dig deep in the world I was studying from afar. I had only *interpreted* the world, but had read somewhere long ago that the point was to *change* it.

Although I contemplated doing some further professional training in computer science and engineering, the solution to my problems came out of nowhere. In 2000, I got a call from a program officer at the Ford Foundation looking to seed "field building" projects in the area of information technology and international security. My proposal was to create a laboratory – a hothouse – that would bring technically

skilled people together to work on projects under my direction in the nexus of the Internet, global security, and human rights. The Citizen Lab was born!

From the outset, The Citizen Lab's mandate has been both research AND development and we have covered both areas well. We helped found and still participate as one of the lead institutions in the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), a project whose aim is to document patterns of Internet censorship worldwide using advanced technical means of network interrogation. (Ronin's installation of a black box in the network of a former Soviet republic was an early entrée to that research).

Today the ONI spans four universities (Cambridge, Harvard, Oxford, and Toronto), nearly twenty NGOs, and about 80 researchers in total. We are testing in more than sixty countries worldwide this month, using software tools developed by the Citizen Lab's researchers. Our reports, which have been described as "lifting the lid on the Internet" are regularly covered by major media organizations. The most recent release of our findings in May 2007 made the front page (above the fold!) of the International Herald Tribune.

On the development side, the Citizen Lab's most prominent engineering project has been our censor-ship circumvention software, called "psiphon." Released in December 2006, psiphon works by leveraging transnational social networks of trust that span censored and uncensored jurisdictions. It starts by having someone in a country like Canada install psiphon on their home computer and then give the connection information privately to a few friends or family members living abroad who then surf through the psiphon-enabled computer, instead of trying to access banned content directly.

As with much of the ONI's outputs, the release of psiphon was a major media event internationally: the release was front page news in the Globe and Mail, covered by the New York Times and Washington Post, and was featured on television broadcasts from Al Jazeera and CBC to BBC and CNN. (China promptly added the Citizen Lab's website to their banned list after the CNN broadcast referred to me as the "Man Behind Bringing Down the Great Firewall of China").

The upside of this shift in career trajectories has been tremendous. I have learned more about the nuts and bolts of Internet communications than I ever imagined possible. (Who would think a political scientist would ever need to understand how routers use tcp reset packets to terminate connections based on keywords?)

My work has had a real world impact beyond my wildest expectations. The ONI has evolved into a major global watchdog organization and psiphon is used by hundreds of thousands of dissidents and activists worldwide. Our recently produced guide to bypassing Internet censorship is being translated into seven languages. We have been actively involved in secure communications training missions from Uzbekistan and Tunisia to Burma and China, often at great personal risk to those involved.

But there are downsides. My work is focused mostly on the immediate day-to-day demands of helping to manage what has essentially become a global civil society intelligence and operational organization. I have had far too little time to take a step back and contemplate the wider implications of our research and development.

After more than five years of forensic investigations, black box deployments, and peoples' revolutions, the time is fast approaching to come in from the code.

Ron Deibert is associate professor of political science and director of the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto. He is the co-editor of Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (forthcoming: MIT Press, 2008).

Tracking the Evolution of Climate Governance

Matthew J. Hoffmann

I am writing this article in the midst of my preparations to attend and observe the next annual installment of the UN-sponsored negotiations to address climate change, set to begin in Bali, Indonesia in early December. The evolution of the international efforts to address climate change has been at the foundation of my research agenda for the last decade and I am noticing more urgency surrounding this meeting than has been evident in the recent past. The prominence of climate change on the international agenda has drastically increased in the course of 2007 with the well-publicized unveiling of the latest scientific reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the coup of a Nobel Peace prize for Al Gore and the climate scientists of the IPCC, and generally dire news about the current speed of climate change. There now appears to be both overwhelming consensus about the nature of the problem and growing momentum for quick and effective action. Yet, curiously, the intensity of feeling that something needs to be done is currently matched by mounting anomie and skepticism surrounding the UN-sponsored Kyoto Protocol process. Calls for its abandonment have grown in number and stridency and the future of global climate governance is uncertain.

Understanding this instability in the global response to climate change represents a significant challenge for

both the study of global environmental governance and the practicalities of creating and implementing measures to solve climate change. The Kyoto Protocol was produced through a process of what I call "mega multilateralism" – multilateral negotiations and treaties that encompass most states in the world. This model of global governance is now being strongly questioned in terms of both its legitimacy and effectiveness. In response to inaction and perceived problems with the mega multilateral process, various actors have begun experimenting with a number of different ways to respond to climate change, challenging the dominance of the conventional approach. Climate governance is thus in flux, an unnerving liminal phase where one accepted means of crafting solutions to global environmental problems is declining and its replacement is uncertain. Understanding and navigating this transition is perhaps the key to progress towards an effective response to climate change.

Out with the old?

The Kyoto Protocol may be both the epitome and ruin of mega multilateralism because it represents so much of what is good and bad about addressing global problems through negotiations and treaties in which all states participate. The Protocol is a universal agreement, negotiated, signed, and ratified by the vast majority of states (over 170 parties at last count) in the world. In engaging and binding states, this approach has perhaps the best chance of producing enforceable rules to govern the climate problem. As difficult as it is to reach agreement amongst states on a complex issue like climate change, there are few (if any) actors beyond states on the world political stage that have the authority to implement and enforce changes in economies and societies across the globe necessary to meet the climate change challenge. In addition universality

and consensual decision-making procedures have the advantage of encouraging widespread buy-in once decisions are reached and it has permitted a more prominent place for equity considerations.

Unfortunately Kyoto is also a model of the drawbacks of mega multilateralism. The Kyoto Protocol itself is a modest achievement. It requires moderate greenhouse gas emission reductions from industrialized states, an average of 5% below 1990 emission levels. It includes flexibility in implementation, allowing states to undertake a wide variety of measures in different places with the goal of minimizing the costs of emission reductions. Yet, because of the multiple and incommensurable negotiating positions (disagreements abound both among industrialized states and between industrialized and industrializing states) around the very large negotiating table, the mega multilateral approach to climate change has stalemated in crucial ways and been held hostage to powerful states like the US that are reluctant to move forward quickly.

Despite the modesty of the Kyoto Protocol, it took enormous compromises to achieve ratification; compromises that weakened a treaty already light on significant greenhouse gas emission reductions. Further, of the two largest emitters in absolute terms, one is a party with no emission reduction requirement (China) and the other has withdrawn (the US). Most states are having trouble meeting their targets, some have abandoned them explicitly (Canada), and those who might achieve their targets have mostly done so because of economic downturn (e.g. the EU's absorption of Eastern European countries) or fortuitously timed energy choices (e.g. the UK's switch from coal to natural gas as the main fuel for electrical generation), rather than climate-specific measures. Industrializing countries that, as the US constantly reminds anyone who will listen, account for an increasing

share of emissions, have no emission reduction requirements and are loathe to discuss future reductions. Given the increasingly dire scientific reports about the pace of warming and the seemingly intractable nature of the problems facing the conventional negotiating process, it is no wonder that the world is approaching the Bali meetings with both high expectations (one of the last chances for saving the Kyoto process?) and a bit of fatalism concerning the prospects for addressing climate change within this framework.

In with the new?

There may be an opportunity to reform the Kyoto process and save a multilateral response to climate change (if not a mega multilateral response). The next set of negotiations (2007-09) on commitments beyond the Kyoto Protocol and the post-Bush US climate policy will determine the fate of mega multilateralism. However, potentially more interesting and certainly more radical developments are occurring outside the UN-sponsored process. Indeed, stalemate and ineffectiveness at the interstate level have been met with the emergence of what I consider to be governance experiments. Like-minded groups and individuals have begun to fill the governance gap in climate change by constructing rules for responding to climate change at multiple levels of politics. Individuals are participating in carbon offsetting markets—purchasing credits to make up for their personal emissions of greenhouse gases. Groups of individuals are taking community-level action in the United Kingdom through carbon rationing action groups that self-impose Kyoto-like targets. Municipalities are organizing to address climate change through international movements like the Cities for Climate Protection Program. Canadian provinces and US states are creating new international carbon markets in lieu of federal actions.

These initiatives are emerging at an astonishing rate and while questions as to their efficacy abound,

they nevertheless serve to challenge the conventional reliance on large multilateral negotiations and treaties as the single way to address climate change. While these efforts are not as comprehensive as mega multilateral approaches, they are worthy of inspection for how they spur new ideas about where responsibility for the response to climate change lies and what kinds of responses are appropriate. They need to be examined so we can understand whether or not they comprise an effective global response to climate change.

Analytically the challenge of the current flux in climate governance is to understand the related dynamics of the decline in mega multilateralism and the emergence of new innovations. When are actors motivated to innovate? How do innovations in responding to climate change interact with each other and with the existing multilateral approach? Can diverse responses to climate change (either through the ascendance of one approach or combination of multiple approaches) add up to an effective solution? Practically, the challenge is deciding how to prioritize efforts between conventional, large multilateral negotiations and treaties and new means of addressing climate change. Such decisions must incorporate the analysis just mentioned while also balancing the nostalgia for (or inertia behind) mega multilateralism, the excitement inherent in new innovations, and the anxiety over both the demise of conventional wisdom and the uncertainty of new ideas. The challenges are significant, but they must be met to bolster hope for an effective global response to the climate crisis.

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Spotlight on Research:

Early Learning and Child Care Governance

Linda White and Martha Friendly

What governance and accountability structures are required to deliver early learning and child care (ELCC) services effectively in Canada? As early learning has experienced a surge of policy attention in OECD countries over the past decade, many states have come to treat ELCC services as a public good, citing not only child development but also mothers' labour force participation and social inclusion as concurrent goals for integrated systems of early childhood education (ECE) and child care. Among the OECD countries, the liberal welfare states - while displaying an increased willingness to accept ECE as a public good - have generally been more resistant than countries influenced by other welfare norms to develop systems that blend ECE and child care and to support them with significant public financing and public policies.

While there has been considerable variation in approach even among the liberal welfare states, in the past decade, these states too have been experimenting with how to finance, structure, and conceptualize ELCC programs. In 2004, the government of Canada and all ten provincial governments began to institute the foundations of a national ELCC program through a series of bilateral agreements. In contrast to previous federal child care initiatives, in 2004 the federal government explicitly framed the new program as "early learning and child care", focusing on the program as the foundation of lifelong learning. The 2006 change in federal government however led to cancellation of the agreements.

At the provincial level, beginning in 1997, the Quebec government progressively implemented a universal child care financing program so that parents pay only $7 per day for ELCC programs for 0-4 year olds while full-day kindergarten is funded for all five-year-olds. More recently, the Ontario government expressed an intention to expand from part-day to full-day kindergarten for four- and five-year-olds. The development of these types of programs could represent the beginning of the last major expansion of the Canadian welfare state and a major expansion of the public education system.

The merging of "child care", typically conceived of in Canada as a social welfare service, and "early childhood education", typically conceived of as a separate service delivered largely through the public school system, provides a leading case for analyzing the dilemmas of developing public services in the context of the contemporary Canadian welfare state. This welfare state has been characterized as liberal and largely market-based, with a New Public Management (NPM) governance structure, and governed by decentralized federalism. Based on assessment of "what works" from a policy perspective, it is our assertion that those three factors potentially represent "three strikes" against successful governance and accountability in the provision of ELCC programs as public goods.

These institutional realities raise the following question for researchers and policy makers: What forms of governance can and should emerge as governments in Canada blend a traditional market-driven child care system with a publicly owned and operated education system? Who should "own" the programs provided; who should finance the programs; who will be able to access the programs; and how will the programs be delivered in a transparent and publicly accountable manner? How must governance structures be recalibrated to more effectively deliver programs that currently exist in a very patchwork form? What are the possibilities of building high quality publicly-financed programs

in the context of these current institutional realities?

Building on our research on child care, federalism, and accountability, the focus of our next research project is to explore aspects of ELCC governance. Governance questions are crucial as, currently several billion public dollars support ELCC programs in Canada and – if the programs continue to progress - much more funding could flow in future. Comparative policy evidence suggests that inadequate governance structures are associated with poor program outcomes in key areas such as equity, access and quality. Critics claim this has been the experience as other liberal welfare regimes have witnessed a huge influx of public monies into ELCC programs – the UK with Sure Start and Australia with demand-side subsidies.

As the Ontario full-day kindergarten program is developed, many questions arise about their governance, ownership and delivery. Will the programs be delivered by the public school system or will public schools merely provide the venue for private, contracted service delivery? Will the programs be staffed by certificated teachers paid according to provincial teacher union wage rates, or by lower-paid early childhood educators? How does one solve the dilemma of coordinating the multiple actors currently involved in the delivery of ELCC services (e.g.

school boards; child care operators; municipal officials; aboriginal organizations)?

The purpose of this collaborative research project is to pull together the burgeoning literature on "best practices" in ELCC governance so as to provide a useful resource for governments which may be searching for an understanding of what works and does not work in the design and delivery of programs. Currently, this research is being conducted both internationally and domestically – in the United States and in Europe – and is being generated across various disciplines (economics, health, psychology, sociology, education, political science and public policy) by both academics and policy practitioners. Our goal is to investigate to what extent the existing research can be usefully applied in Canada, given the three important policy contexts identified above: the liberal market-based welfare regime; the New Public Management governance structure; and the federal-provincial-municipal dimension to policy making. It is our intention to include researchers from various disciplines, as well as government and stakeholder groups in this collaborative project.

Linda White is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Toronto

The Political Economy of Credit in Rural China

Lynette Ong

My research that examines the politics of credit allocation in rural China speaks to several debates in the political science literature, such as the role of local states in industrialization and the (de)merits of fiscal decentralization.

In rural China, the local credit cooperatives are the only credit institutions from which farmers can obtain loans, either for agricultural or consumption purposes, or as start-up capital for new businesses. Ironically, the 35,000 Rural Credit Cooperatives that are located in townships throughout rural China disburse *less than* one-quarter of their total loans to farmer-households. The bulk of their lending goes to enterprises or projects that are related to local governments.

Why do loans of the rural credit cooperatives go to local government-related enterprises? Do local authorities benefit from this pattern of credit allocation? And if they do,

how do they benefit from it?

Looking at the relationship between states and capital allocation, one is likely to jump to the conclusion that this is a classic case of patronage – credit institutions are connected with local political elites, and therefore money is siphoned off to the private pockets of local governments. Of course, patronage exists in rural China, but the real story – as I have discovered – is more nuanced and systemic.

Since the launch of economic reforms in the early 1980s by Deng Xiaoping, the fiscal system has been decentralized to an extent that the

local authorities have significant fiscal responsibilities to finance the provision of local public goods and services, such as salaries of school teachers and health care workers, as well as costs of infrastructure-building in their jurisdictions. The rationale of fiscal decentralization, from the central government's perspective, is to provide incentives for local governments to engage in revenue-seeking activities by allowing them to retain taxation revenues from the commercial activities. But local authorities are inadequately funded through the fiscal system not only because their major tax revenues are remitted to the central government in Beijing, but also because the inter-governmental transfer system does not adequately finance the shortfalls between expenditures and revenues of local governments. Therefore, given the immense fiscal pressure to spend on public goods provision, local authorities had to find ways to generate revenue. Setting up collectively-owned but in reality local government-controlled enterprises was a common way to raise tax income. Local governments benefited from collective enterprises in two ways: profits went to local governments' coffers if the enterprises were profitable; and local authorities could impose various "social obligations" on enterprises such as financing construction of drinking wells, paved roads and primary schools for the local communities. These collectively-owned enterprises were the township- and village-enterprises that underlay massive rural industrialization throughout the 1980s and first half of the 1990s.

Most of the literature on rural industrialization in China was written in the mid-1990s and the majority of it lauded the role of local states in spearheading industrialization in rural China. However, a critical reassessment is much needed given

the widespread collapse of these rural enterprises, and the privatization since the mid-1990s.

Behind the upbeat story of local state-directed development, things look a lot bleaker from the perspective of local credit organizations that have funded the bulk of rural

Lynette Ong

enterprise growth. Some of the rural enterprises grew to become the pillars of local economies, providing jobs and much-needed fiscal revenue for local governments, but most of them operated in the red, and were kept afloat only by easy access to loans from credit institutions made possible by guarantees from local governments. Therefore, when the central government tightened monetary policy in the mid-1990s, making it more difficult for enterprises to gain access to working capital, many of these firms struggled to survive. Instead of being "cash cows", the local government-controlled enterprises turned out to be financial liabilities for the local authorities. Starting in 1997, local governments sought to close down the unprofitable ones, or sold them off to managers of existing enterprises who were often linked to local governments in one way or another. Currently, 95% of all col-

lectively-owned enterprises in rural China have been either privatized or shut down. But the money that these enterprises owed to local credit cooperatives remains either outstanding, or has been written off by the credit institutions as "bad debt". When the relationship between local credit cooperatives and collectively-owned enterprises was at its height, the *official* non-performing loan rate of the credit cooperatives was as high as 50%. This meant that 50 out of every 100 *yuan* of loans were irrecoverable.

What I have depicted is the general picture of the political economy of credit in rural China. This calls into question the validity of earlier literature that credits the growth of China to fiscal decentralization, "hard budget constraints" faced by the rural enterprises , and the "developmental" (and its variants, such as "corporatist" and "entrepreneurial") role of local states in spearheading rural industrialization.

Of course, there is variation in terms of the success of enterprises, financial health of local credit institutions and degree of involvement by local authorities in the credit system. Some localities have seen a greater degree of local state involvement in resource allocations than others, and the transformation of rural enterprises has exhibited different patterns throughout rural China. My next project consists of further field research in rural China to provide more in-depth analysis of the "varieties of capitalism" that exist in different parts of the middle kingdom.

Lynette Ong is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Toronto

At the intersection of environmental protection, human rights and sustainable development:

Results of the International Community Forestry Workshop

By Mark Purdon

While the issue of climate change has come to dominate the headlines, this has only occurred after the signs of change have become impossible to ignore. All too often environmental degradation is subtle, escaping detection. How would we know if we are catching too many fish or cutting down too many trees? For many, the answer lies less with the determination of sustainable yield or the optimum size for national parks, but with creating a new relationship between people and the environment. This was the motivation for an international community forestry workshop held on September 30, 2007 at the Munk Centre for International Studies. Wearing both my academic and NGO hat, I led the organization of this workshop in my capacity as interim chair of the Canadian Environmental Network (RCEN) Forest Caucus. The goal of the workshop was to produce a common statement—a *Call to Action*—to move the issue of community forestry forward.

In essence, community forestry allocates rights over forest resources to local communities and Indigenous Peoples. It lies then at the intersection of environmental protection, human rights and sustainable development. The idea is that local communities would be more sustainable stewards of local forest resources, as they have a vested interest in the maintenance of social and ecological health. But it is never so simple and challenges abound. The one-day workshop sought to address these issues by bringing together leading community forestry advocates, practitioners and researchers from across Canada with those working internationally and in developing countries.

The workshop's aim was both to raise awareness about new research developments in community forestry and to agree on a strategy to move this approach forward at the global level. The workshop also offered excellent opportunities for networking with more than 60 participants, including 20 international delegates from Africa, Latin America, South and

Delegates and Organizing Committee of the International Community Forestry Workshop

East Asia and Russia. Furthermore, delegates were able to participate in an international forestry congress hosted by the University of Toronto, Faculty of Forestry held from October 1st to the 3rd. The workshop was actually an official side-event to the larger forest congress.

The workshop's morning session on September 30 was devoted to discussion of political reform for community forestry including land tenure, governance, gender issues as well as the rights of Indigenous Peoples. The keynote speaker was Professor Arun Agrawal, a renowned expert on community forestry and common property regimes from the University of Michigan. Other speakers included members of leading NGOs such as the Federation of Community Forest Users – Nepal (FECOFUN), the Global Caucus on Community Based Forest Management (GCCBFM), the British Columbia Community Forest Association (BCCFA) and the National Aboriginal Forestry Association (NAFA).

The afternoon session was spent in break-out groups, that is, more intimate groups intending to foster ideas for the *Call to Action*. After a brief dinner, participants worked well into the evening on this joint statement and emerged, somewhat bleary eyed, with a first draft. This was refined over subsequent days and presented on October 3 at the final plenary of the international forestry congress. The *Call to Action* identifies responsibilities of forest communities, Indigenous Peoples, governments, civil society, the private sector, international actors and academic community, in order to realize the delegates' vision of community forestry: that local communities and Indigenous Peoples will play a meaningful role in managing forests and that such peoples, both women and men, are fully empowered as decision-makers with clear rights and responsibilities to manage, use and control forests and forest lands.

Workshop participants intend to build on the energy generated at the meeting. Canadian participants expressed a desire to see better coordination of community forestry work in Canada, possibly through the forging of a pan-Canadian community forestry alliance. Internationally, participants expressed the desire to improve coordination of community forestry efforts through an international community forestry organization comprised of local forest communities, Indigenous Peoples, practitioners, NGOs, and researchers.

The need for international coordination on community forestry is urgent, particularly given that the UN Climate Change Conference this past December in Bali saw new developments regarding the contribution of forests and land-use change towards climate change mitigation. The re-emergence of the issue of reducing deforestation in developing countries and the growing momentum behind using reforestation in the carbon market all have important implications for traditional land-use practices. By establishing an institutional frame-

work for the recognition of local land-use rights and discouraging unsustainable land-use practices, community forestry has the potential to reduce deforestation and also to direct business opportunities available through the carbon market to the benefit of local forest communities and Indigenous Peoples. Thanks to the contacts established at the Toronto workshop, delegates were able to organize the presentation of the *Call to Action* at a side-event in Bali.

But community forestry is also important in Canada! With increasing pressure being put on the Canadian forest sector, individuals, organizations and communities across Canada are mobilizing around community forestry as a

potential solution, one which can create sustainable jobs and a greater sense of responsibility towards forest resources. Examples are the BC Community Forestry Association (www.bccfa.ca) and the Northern Ontario Sustainable Communities Partnership (www.gcf-on.ca/noscp/).

Please join us in fulfilling this global vision of community forestry for the 21st century. You or your organization are invited to sign-on to the Call to Action. Send your request to Mark Purdon (mark.purdon@utoronto.ca). Further information on the international community forestry workshop can be found at www.cenrce.org/eng/caucuses/forest/index.html#projects, including versions of the Call to Action in English, French and Spanish.

Institutions matter to baseball:

How two journalists from Colorado could have kept Philadelphia's Jimmy Rollins from winning the National League Most Valuable Player Award.

Renan Levine

I like to teach my students that political institutions matter for policy-making. One way institutions matter is in determining the outcome of an election. Different voting rules, whether first-past-the-post, "MMP", or proportional representation, create different strategic incentives for both candidates and voters. But even if nothing changes, the outcome may not be the same under an alternative voting method. This is true when thinking about whether to reform how Ontario elects its provincial legislature, and in baseball!

At the close of the 2007 season, the shortstop for the Philadelphia Phillies, Jimmy Rollins, won the

National League MVP award by only 17 points over the Colorado Rockies' Matt Holliday. While many credit Rollins' victory to his hitting prowess, stellar defense and team leadership, Rollins can also thank two Colorado journalists who could have cast ballots that enabled their hometown favorite to take the award.

These journalists could have easily influenced the outcome of the election thanks to the method Major League Baseball, and several other sporting organizations, use to anoint the end-of-year award winners. To select the most valuable player, two journalists from every major league city must rank ten players from first to tenth on their ballots. The first place selection of each journalist receives ten points plus a four point bonus, a second place ranking receives nine points, third place receives eight points and so on down to the tenth place candidate, who receives one point. The winner receives the most points.

This method of voting is a modification of what scholars call a "Borda count," after the scholar who first proposed the method. Jean-Charles

Jimmy Rollins

de Borda (1733-1799) was a French naval officer who participated in the siege of Cornwallis in Yorktown. He is best known, though, for his avocational interest in math and physics. Borda proposed this method of voting as a way for the French Academy of Sciences to elect new members in 1770.

Borda's method is excellent for identifying candidates who enjoy broad support across the electorate, rather than just the support of a passionate plurality of voters. As a result, it could be very useful in divided societies. Consider what might have happened in Chile in 1970 if Borda's method was used. Instead of socialist Salvator Allende winning with only 36.2 percent of

the vote over two bourgeois opponents, a less radical candidate with support from all sectors may have prevailed.

Borda's method, though, is very rarely used to elect public officials because it has a flaw that led Borda to reportedly concede that "my scheme is intended only for honest men." The flaw is that Borda's method is readily susceptible to strategic manipulation. According to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, no voting system is strategy-proof. All voting methods can be manipulated and every method provides incentives for voters to vote in a manner that does not reflect their true preferences. However, Borda's method is particularly vulnerable because it relies on a ranking system. After voters name his or her favorite, they can give a further boost to their favorite by deliberately lowering the rank of a rival.

Indeed, this is what happened in the voting for the American League MVP voting in 1947. That season, Ted Williams of the Boston Red Sox won the Triple Crown, leading the league in hitting, home runs and RBIs. Yet Joe DiMaggio of the Yankees won the award by one point. What was startling in 1947 was that one writer left Williams off his ballot altogether despite Williams' accomplishments! Williams himself alleged that this voter was a Boston journalist with a grudge; others speculated that it was a New York journalist determined to give the award to DiMaggio. More recently, some historians theorize that the omissions could have been motivated by a journalist seeking to influence the outcome of the award because he had placed a bet on the outcome and would receive a higher payoff if the outcome was not Williams, the favorite.

A similar turn of events transpired in 1999, when two writers left Boston's Pedro Martinez, a starting pitcher, off the ballot. Texas' Ivan Rodriquez won by 13 votes, so if both of the voters who left Martinez off the ballot ranked him at least fourth, Martinez would have won. In this case, the motivation was more benign: these two voters felt that no starting pitcher, playing every four or five days, deserved to be named Most Valuable Player.

Imagine what would have happened if two journalists who thought Holliday deserved to win in 2007 behaved like these two writers in 1999. If two voters left Rollins off the ballot instead of giving him a second place vote (worth 9 points), Rollins would have lost by a single point.

Jean-Charles de Borda

This problem is a major reason why the Borda count is hardly ever used to elect public officials. When voters have a vested interest at stake in the outcome of the election, they are unlikely to behave as honestly as Borda required. Instead, we mainly find the method used in circumstances like this, when choosing an award recipient. It is unlikely that the journalists who vote for MVP have a personal vested interest in the outcome, and therefore we might expect them to provide a sincere rank-ordering.

The ease with which voters can manipulate the Borda method is not the only problem political scientists have with the method. From a normative perspective, Borda's count may select the *wrong* winner. One of Borda's most distinguished contemporaries, the Marquis de Condorcet, proposed that any winner in a multi-candidate race *ought* to be the socially preferred to any other candidate in head-to-head comparisons. Even if voters vote sincerely, the Borda count may not select the Condorcet winner.

The votes cast in this election illustrate such a scenario. If Borda's original method was used to tally the votes, without any first place bonuses, Holliday would have won by three points! This is not a problem if Holliday was the Condorcet winner. However, Rollins was at least tied with Holliday as the Condorcet winner. Rollins won half of the 32 first place votes. Holliday won eleven, and Milwaukee's Prince Fielder received five votes. If all five of Fielder's first place voters backed Holliday in a head-to-head contest, Holliday and Rollins would have tied. However, if just one Fielder voter preferred Rollins to Holliday, Rollins would have been the Condorcet winner. Individual preference rankings are not released by Major League Baseball, but this is not an unreasonable expectation. If all sixteen Rollins voters were sincere, Holliday could not have been the outright Condorcet winner. And yet, Holliday would have been the winner under Borda's original scheme.

Other voting methods also do not necessarily choose the Condorcet winner. Condorcet's actual method is akin to a round-robin tournament that is cumbersome when there are many candidates in the race, some of whom will surely be obscure. In mass elections, we find several methods designed to reduce the final number of candidates, such as the run-off system used to elect the French President. This system may eliminate the Con-

Awards

We would like to congratulate some of our faculty and students for their achievements in the second part of 2007. Prof. **Janice Stein** *was named to the Order of Canada and the Order of Ontario.* Prof. **Ron Deibert** *was included in the December issue of Esquire Magazine as one of the 'Best and Brightest of the year 2007' list.* Congratulations also to our own **Luiz Arthur Bihari** and **Matthew Fulkerson** for winning the Dean's Essay Prize for the best undergraduate essay and the best graduate essay of the 2007 Arts and Science competition. *The news regarding the winners of the Dean Awards give us the opportunity to remind all POL instructors and teaching assistants to take the time to flag outstanding student essays and to make sure to bring them to the attention of the Dean.*

dorcet winner in the first round, but recent research suggests that Nicolas Sarkozy was also the Condorcet winner in 2007. The party primary system used to select candidates in the United States, or the nominating conventions used in Canada will often select a nominee popular with the party membership who is not necessarily the most popular candidate among the general electorate. As a result, centrist candidates like Rudy Giuliani are often disadvantaged.

If there are no limits on which candidates are considered by voters using a Condorcet method, a voting cycle may occur. If there is a voting cycle, Candidate A is preferred to Candidate B, B defeats Candidate C, but Candidate C is preferred to Candidate A. In this case, there would be no winner or the outcome of the election would be solely determined by the order in which the candidates are considered. To avoid endless cycling, most legislatures have rules determining the order of business. For example, the final vote on legislation in the U.S. Congress is always between the status quo and a bill (as amended). This guarantees that any new legislation is always Condorcet-pre- ferred by members of Congress to the status quo.

Baseball enjoys no such guarantees, but in 2007, the baseball world can be relieved that the right winner was selected (and not David Wright of the New York Mets). The Borda count method of voting did select the Condorcet winner. Holliday can seek consolation in baseball's most familiar refrain, "wait 'til next year."

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